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be enhanced by requiring state courts to follow clear and uncontradicted
holdings of lower federal courts on constitutional questions. This would seem
especially appropriate when the federal court involved is a district court
within the state or a court of appeals whose circuit includes the state. In
this fashion uniformity of federal law could be achieved in all state and
federal courts within a circuit, leaving only disparities among the circuits to
be resolved by the Supreme Court. But whether uniformity of laws, forum
shopping, availability of federal remedies, or the ultimate power under the
supremacy clause is considered more important, surely all are worthy of
examination by any court adjudicating a conflict involving the relationship
of federal and state courts.
If it is true that "the federal courts are the unique tribunals which are
to be utilized to preserve the civil rights of the people,"4 then this decision
must be looked upon as a blow to the enforcement of civil liberties. It seems
unlikely that Lawrence will be considered as the final disposition of the
constitutional question discussed here." An ordered relationship between the
federal and state courts would seem to require that this clear conflict be re-
solved in a more probing fashion. As long as this decision stands, it will
make uncertain and suspect the concept of "the primacy of the federal judici-
ary in deciding questions of federal constitutional law."'
Boyd Mangrum
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The First Landmark
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Prior to July 2, 1965 (the effective date of title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964),' the Duke Power Company openly discriminated on the basis of race
in the hiring and assigning of employees at its Dan River plant at Draper, North
Carolina.' The plant was organized into five operating departments: ( 1 ) labor,
(2) coal handling, (3) operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory and
test. Negroes were relegated to the labor department and were prevented access
to other departments by reason of their race.' In 1955 the company instituted
a policy of requiring a high school education for initial assignment to any de-
l Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "National
sentiment also regards federal tribunals as the appropriate guardians of federal rights."
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515 (1928).
'However, Lawrence itself has already been cited as authority. Brown v. State, 466
S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
'England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964).
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (July 2, 1964), 78 Stat. 241 (codified
in 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to
2000h-6 (1964)).
'Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 248 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (finding of the
trial court).
'Id. at 247. The labor department was the least desirable in the plant, the maximum
wage being $1.565 per hour. In the other departments wages ranged from a minimum of
$1.705 to a maximum of from $3.18 to $3.65 per hour.
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partment except labor, and for transfer from coal handling to any "inside" de-
partment (operations, maintenance, or laboratory). When the company aban-
doned its policy of restricting Negroes to the labor department in 1965, com-
pletion of high school also was made a prerequisite for transfer from labor to
any other department. On July 2, 1965, the company added a further require-
ment for new employees: to qualify for placement in any but the labor depart-
ment, the prospective employee had to register satisfactory scores on two pro-
fessionally prepared aptitude tests, as well as have a high school education.
Only the completion of high school was required of employees eligible for
transfer to the four desirable departments if the incumbent had been employed
prior to the time of the new requirement. In September 1965 the company
began to permit incumbent employees who lacked a high school education to
qualify for transfer from labor or coal handling to an "inside" job by passing
two tests-the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purports to measure general
intelligence, and the Bennett Mechanical Aptitude Test. Neither was directed
or intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or cate-
gory of jobs.4
In 1967 a group of thirteen incumbent Negro employees brought a class
action against Duke Power Company, claiming that the company's educational
and testing requirements were discriminatory and invalid. The district court
found that although the company had engaged in discriminatory practices prior
to the passage of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' thereafter the com-
pany had not limited, classified, segregated, or discriminated against its em-
ployees in any way which had deprived or tended to deprive them of any em-
ployment opportunities because of race or color.' The district court also found
the legislative history of the Act to be replete with evidence of Congress' in-
tention that the Act be applied prospectively and not retroactively; and, con-
sequently, the impact of prior inequities was beyond the reach of corrective
action authorized by the Act.' In addition, the district court stated: "Nowhere
does the Act require that employers may utilize only those tests which accurate-
ly measure the ability and skills required of a particular job or group of jobs."'
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,9 granting relief to
six Negro employee-plaintiffs without a high school education or its equivalent
who were discriminatorily hired only into the labor department and subse-
quently locked in by the adoption of the high school education requirement in
1955.10 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that a test did not
have to be job-related in order to be valid under section 703 (h), and denied
relief to the four Negro employees without a high school education who were
hired after the adoption of the educational requirement." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 Held, reversed: An employer is prohibited
41d. at 250.
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).8292 F. Supp. at 251.
Id. at 248.
'Id. at 250.
'Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
'lld. at 1236.
"Id. at 1235.
11399 U.S. 926 (1970).
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from requiring a high school education or the passing of a standardized general
intelligence test as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs when ( 1)
neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job perform-
ance, (2) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants, and (3) the jobs in question formerly had
been filled only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving
preference to whites. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Legislative History. The passage of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"s
by the Eighty-Eighth Congress will probably be recorded in history as the most
important piece of legislation in the field of labor law in this second half of the
twentieth century. Title VII, dealing with equal employment opportunity,
marked the passage of the first comprehensive federal law in this area after
many years of proposals and counterproposals.14
The act had its beginning in the Kennedy administration; a draft of his pro-
posed legislation went to Congress in mid-1963. The assassination of President
Kennedy put a spotlight on the unfinished legislative business of his program
and provided the impetus needed to move the bill through the Congress. Passed
by the House in early 1964, the bill received extensive debate in the Senate."
It was in the Senate debates that Senator John Tower added an amendment
which was to become section 703 (h) -the provision relating to, among other
things, the use of professionally developed ability tests by employers.
Senator Tower's amendment was a result of a decision by a hearing examiner
for the Illinois Fair Employment Commission in Myart v. Motorola Co." That
decision had been widely interpreted as invalidating any test which had an ad-
verse impact on blacks without regard to business need.' Shortly after the
Motorola case Senators Clark and Case introduced an interpretative memo-
randum on the constitutionality of the Act which declared:
There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide
qualification tests where, because of differences in background and education,
members of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than
members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as
he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications,
and he may hire, assign, and promote on this basis of test performance. 8
Not satisfied with this explanation, Senator Tower put the full text of the
Motorola decision in the record" and introduced an amendment to make it
clear that the extreme implications of Motorola would not be incorporated into
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
"4See, e.g., Civil Rights and the South-A Symposium, 42 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1963);
Emancipation Proclamation Centennial Symposium, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 401 (1963); Sym-
posium on Civil Rights, 24 FED. B.J. 1 (1964).
"The debate in the Senate lasted over 534 hours. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 21 (1964).
"The text of the examiner's report is reprinted at 110 CONG. REc. 5662-64 (1964).
'See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 5614-16 (1964) (remarks of Senator Ervin); id. at
5999-6000 (remarks of Senator Smathers); id. at 7012-13 (remarks of Senator Holland);
id. at 9599-9600 (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
" 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).
"Id. at 13,493.
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title VII. He stated his purpose to be the protection of tests "designed to deter-
mine or predict whether an individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his
employment in the particular business or enterprise involved."" The amend-
ment was rejected after an attack by the proponents of title VII, who alleged
that it was loosely worded and gave the employer an absolute right to use a
professionally designed test even if it operated discriminatorily." A compromise
version was introduced, passed without debate, and constitutes the present sec-
tion 703(h). That section provides that it shall not be unlawful: "for an em-
ployer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results
is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race .... ""
In addition to the legislative history of 703 (h), another possible indication
of congressional intent is that an amendment requiring a "direct relation" be-
tween the test and a "particular position" was proposed in May 1968, but was
defeated."
EEOC Guidelines. Guidelines relating to testing have been established by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.' The Guidelines, which were
originally issued in 1966 and revised in 1970, unequivocally require that the
tests be job-related. The Guidelines define the term "test" as "any paper-and-
pencil or performance measure used as a basis for any employment decision,"'
and the definition
includes, but is not restricted to, measures of general intelligence, mental ability
and learning ability; specific intellectual abilities; mechanical, clerical and
other aptitudes; dexterity and coordination; knowledge and proficiency; occu-
pational and other interests; and attitudes, personality or temperament. The
term 'test' includes all formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques of
assessing job suitability including, in addition to the above, specific qualifying
or disqualifying personal history or background requirements, specific edu-
cational or work history requirements, scored interviews, biographical infor-
mation blanks, interviewer's rating scales, scored application forms, etc.'"
One can see that by defining "test" as any "paper-and-pencil or performance
measure" and including in that definition all of the above items, the EEOC
intends the definition of "test" to include any and all measures used by the em-
ployer in making his employment decision. Any written criteria, whether com-
'"ld. at 13,492.
21Id. at 13,504 (remarks of Senator Case).
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964) (emphasis added). Senator Humphrey, one of the
bill's principal proponents, commented: "Senators on both sides of the aisle who were
deeply interested in Title VII have examined the text of this amendment and have found
it to be in accord with the intent and purpose of that title." 110 CONG. REC. 13,724
(1964).
"1S. REP. No. 1111, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1968).
4 The five-member Equal Employment Opportunity Commission performs its tasks
through a system of formal and informal remedial procedures, with the emphasis on efforts
to obtain voluntary compliance. The Commission is established under section 705 of title
VII, and the procedures it follows in preventing and remedying unlawful employment
practices are set forth in section 706.
"535 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).




posed by the employee in the form of an application blank, intelligence test,
or summary of personal history, or composed by the employer in the form of
scored interviews and interviewer rating scales, are within the EEOC's definition
of "test." If any of the above measures are used by the employer in making his
employment decision and adversely affect any class protected by title VII, such
use is considered discrimination by the EEOC unless: "(a) The test has been
validated and evidences a high degree of utility, and (b) The person giving or
acting upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that alternative
suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use.""8
The EEOC Guidelines also require that the employer have available evi-
dence of the test's validity, which "should consist of empirical data demon-
strating that the test is predictive or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated."29
In addition, the EEOC Guidelines require a "differential validity" study."0
This means that "[dlata must be generated and results separately reported for
minority and nonminority groups wherever technically feasible."" Also, the
"presentation of the results of a validation study must include graphical and
statistical representations of the relationships between the test, and the criteria,
permitting judgments of the test's utility in making predictions of future work
behavior."2 The guidelines specifically state that, "Under no circumstances will
the general reputation of a test, its author or its publisher, or casual reports of
test utility be accepted in lieu of evidence of validity."' The employer cannot
avoid the Guidelines by going through independent employment agencies,
since those agencies are required to meet the same standards of test validity as
employers. 4 The Guidelines clearly prohibit disparate or unequal treatment in
testing of employees: "Thus, no new test or other employee selection standard
can be imposed upon a class of individuals protected by Title VII who, but for
prior discrimination, would have been granted the opportunity to qualify under
less stringent selection standards previously in force.""5
II. EMPLOYEE TESTING
It has been estimated that fifteen to twenty per cent of all charges filed under
title VII involve a testing issue.' At first glance this may seem to be a high
percentage, but when it is considered that practically every employer requires
a test of one kind or another in determining who will be hired, promoted, or
28 Id.
29 Id.
"0Id.; see notes 41-43 infra, and accompanying text for an explanation of the testing
theory aspects of "differential validity."




41d. at 12,335-36.Id. at 12,336.
26 Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1637
(1969). In addition, see generally Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1968); Note, Legal Implications of
the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
691 (1968).
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assigned to the most desirable job, the estimate is really not surprising. What
is surprising is that aptitude or ability tests in common usage in many instances
do not measure what they purport to measure. While there are several reasons
for this, probably the foremost is that tests usually simply "measure how well
a person has assimilated the knowledge and skills that the particular test is
measuring. Regardless of whether the test is an 'aptitude' or 'achievement'
test, the crucial factors in a person's score are the same, namely the quality and
extent of his past schooling and training and his cultural background and en-
vironment."' Racial discrimination, particularly in the South, has resulted in
lesser educational and cultural opportunities for blacks, which in turn has re-
sulted in lower average scores on most standardized tests.'
Another important consideration is the validity of the test used to determine
whether the applicant has the particular qualifications the job requires. It can
hardly be said that the test is a useful predictor of future performance if the
employer has never correlated test results with actual performance on the job.
However, there is evidence that this is more often the case than not. " One
textbook view is that "[njo matter how complete the test author's research, the
person who is developing a selection or classification program must, in the end,
confirm for himself the validity of the test in his particular situation. *... He
must validate the test in his own school or factory . 40
The above points, when combined, create another problem that further com-
plicates the subject. Even if a test has some validity (i.e., it measures and is
predictive of the presence of qualities or attributes which are necessary to the
successful performance of a particular job), the "equal exposure" assumption
usually leads to differing degrees of prediction for different groups.4' "In some
cases, the tests may accurately predict white job performance but not black per-
formance .... In other cases, tests may accurately predict job performance for
" Cooper & Sobol, supra note 36, at 1637. In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
478 (D.D.C. 1967), the court stated the same proposition in these words:
It used to be the prevailing theory that aptitude tests-or 'intelligence' tests
as they are often called, although the term is obviously misleading--do mea-
sure some stable, predetermined intellectual process that can be isolated and
called intelligence. Today modern experts in educational testing and psy-
chology have rejected this concept as false ...
• . . In other words, an aptitude test is necessarily measuring a student's
background, his environment. It is a test of his cumulative experience in his
home, his community and his school.
The Wonderlic Personnel Test, which was one of the tests administered by Duke Power
Company, is one of the more popular general ability tests. It has been described as follows:
All spiral omnibus tests (of which Wonderlic is an example) operate on the
principle of sampling a wide range of knowledge and skills principally of
the kinds that are acquired in school and by reading within the tradition of
Anglo-American culture . . . .They have the disadvantage of relying on the
assumption that those who take them have had a uniform exposure to our
white, middle-class environment.
Note, supra note 36, at 712.
8Cooper & Sobol, supra note 36, at 1598, 1637-41 (1969). See also OFFICE OF EDU-
CATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 219-20 (1966); Kirkwood, Selection Techniques and the
Law: To Test or Not To Test?, 44 PERSONNEL, Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 18.
"9See J. RUSMORE, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT TESTING IN THE
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 3-4 (1967) (only 1 of 39 employers surveyed had local vali-
dation information, although 85% used tests).
o Cooper & Sobol, supra note 36, at 1647.41 Id. at 1646.
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both blacks and whites, but do so at different levels. In other words, a score of
ten for the average black may predict adequate performance while for the
average white a score of twelve is needed to predict adequate performance.""
This is known in the testing world as "differential validity."'
The above indicates the complexity of job aptitude testing and its potential
as a tool of intentional or unintentional discrimination.
III. GRIGGS v. DUKE POWER CO.
As the first case decided on the merits by the United States Supreme Court
under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' Griggs is necessarily a land-
mark decision in the burgeoning field of equal employment opportunity law.
The case concerned the use of ability tests and high school diplomas as a cri-
teria in the selection, transfer, and promotion of employees when the criteria
employed had the effect of screening out and/or blocking the advancement of
a substantially higher number of blacks than whites. Perhaps Judge Sobeloff,
the dissenter in the Fourth Circuit's consideration of Griggs,' best expressed
the importance of the case when he said:
The decision we make today is likely to be as pervasive in its effect as any we
have been called upon to make in recent years. . . . The case presents the
broad question of the use of allegedly objective employment criteria resulting
in the denial to Negroes of jobs for which they are potentially qualified....
On this issue hangs the validity of the employment provisions (Title VII) of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act: whether the Act shall remain a potent tool for
equalization of employment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous but
hollow rhetoric.'
The Supreme Court opinion by Chief Justice Burger, although clothed in
generalities, does give the Act the liberal interpretation necessary for it to re-
main a potent tool for equalization of employment opportunity."4 The Court
stated that "[u~nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."" The
Court discarded the defense of absence of discriminatory intent: "[Glood in-
tent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment pro-
cedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." " Thus, the test is an ob-
jective one; there will be no inquiry into subjective intent, and an employer
who persists in an employment practice with knowledge that it discriminates
against protected minority groups will be presumed to intend the consequences
of his actions, and will have to meet the standards of job-relatedness and busi-
421 d.
43Id.
-42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
S420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).4Id. at 1237-38.
471d.
48 401 U.S. at 430.
4'ld. at 432. The Court also stated that "Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Id. "The touchstone is business necessity." Id. at 431.
(Vol. 25
NOTES
ness necessity in order to justify testing.
By requiring that testing or measuring procedures demonstrate "a reason-
able measure of job performance,"' and concluding "that the EEOC's con-
struction of section 703(h) to require that employment tests be job related
comports with Congressional intent,""1 affording "good reason to treat the
Guidelines as expressing the will of Congress,"5 it is very possible that the
Court may require employers to conform to all EEOC requirements in the area
of employment testing. It should be pointed out that although section 703 (h)
applies only to testing, and not to high school diploma requirements," the
EEOC definition of "test" includes any "specific educational ... requirement.""4
But this is really a moot point since the Court's opinion clearly requires the
same job-relatedness standard for high school diplomas or college degrees as it
does for tests: "The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as
fixed measures of capability .... Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but
Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to be-
come masters of reality."5 Thus, it appears that the current practice of estab-
lishing the mandatory requirement that an applicant possess a high school di-
ploma or college degree in order to be considered for employment may be-
come a thing of the past if it tends to discriminate against minority groups
(which it probably will, especially in the South) and it fails to measure up to
the EEOC "validity" requirements (which will probably occur in many cases).
This thesis is clearly demonstrated in Griggs, where the evidence established
that in North Carolina thirty-four per cent of white males had completed high
school, but only twelve per cent of Negro males had done so." Unquestionably
the diploma requirement tended to discriminate against Negroes, and, in the
absence of evidence of job-relatedness, the Court struck down the requirement.
Other statements made by the Court are unclear. The Court stated that
"[blasic intelligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself
fairly in a testing process, '-5 7 and "Congress has now required that the posture
and condition of the job seeker be taken into account."'5 These statements indi-
cate that the Court is suggesting the application of different standards for blacks
in some instances to compensate for inferior education received because of prior
discriminatory practices. Such an indication is reinforced by the Court's dis-
cussion of its decision in Gaston County v. United States,"0 wherein the institu-
tion of a literacy test for voter registration was disallowed on the ground that
the test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race due
to the inferior education received by blacks in North Carolina."0 In an employ-
50 Id. at 436.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 434; cf. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 FEP Cases 767 (1971).
"401 U.S. at 433 n.8.
"435 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
25401 U.S. at 433.
5' 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION: 1960, pt. 35, table 47.
m 401 U.S. at 430.28Id. at 431.
59395 U.S. 285 (1969).
go Id. at 296.
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ment context this may mean that an employer in Mississippi, although able to
show that his written test is job-related and necessary to his business, may have
to devise a less difficult test or offer a performance test to black applicants to
take into account "the posture and condition of the job-seeker" (inferior edu-
cation) and allow the black applicant the means of articulation to "manifest
fairly" his basic intelligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Griggs is important for two major reasons. The first
is the immediate impact that it will have upon the use of various employment
testing and measuring procedures by the employer. The second, and probably
more important, is the liberal construction the Court gives the Act for the lower
federal courts to follow in deciding future title VII cases.
The Immediate Impact. The consequences of requiring employers to conform
to the EEOC Guidelines will probably be two-fold. First, the small employer,
after reviewing the EEOC Guidelines, may decide to dispense with testing alto-
gether. The larger employer may decide to employ testing procedures, but will
probably do so only if convinced that it is absolutely necessary to the successful
operation of his business. The reason for this is that the Guidelines are so
comprehensive and require such a detailed set of procedures for administering
and validating tests that most employers will find it economically unfeasible to
comply.
One important question pointed out, but not decided, in Griggs is the extent
to which "testing requirements that take into account capability for the next
succeeding position or related future promotion might be utilized upon a show-
ing that such long-range requirements fulfill a genuine business need."'" The
EEOC Guidelines provide:
If job progression structures and seniority provisions are so established that
new employees will probably, within a reasonable period of time and in a
great majority of cases, progress to a higher level, it may be considered that
candidates are being evaluated for jobs at that higher level .... This point is
made to underscore the principle that attainment of or performance at a higher
level job is a relevant criterion in validating employment tests only when there
is a high probability that persons employed will in fact attain that higher level
within a reasonable period of time.62
No doubt there will be litigation on this point, and it may be one area in which
the EEOC will have to give ground. Clearly many employment practices that
have been in use for many years and have been considered standard up to now
will be challenged, and will have to meet the job-relatedness standard imposed
by Griggs and defined in the EEOC Guidelines. 3
Construction of Title VII. While one can draw one's own conclusions about
the intent of Congress regarding section 703 (h), the Court indicated that the
61401 U.S. at 432.
6235 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
' In reporting the Griggs decision the Wall Street Journal stated:
Following the court actions yesterday, a leading group of civil-rights lawyers
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EEOC Guidelines, at least to some extent, are indicative of that intent."4 In es-
sence, the EEOC requirements are the same as those laid down by the Supreme
Court in Griggs: (1) that the test be job-related, and (2) that there must be a
substantial degree of business necessity for using it in view of its discriminatory
effect.'
Just how liberally the Burger Court will interpret title VII is a question
that can only be answered by years of litigation. There will undoubtedly be
some give-and-take between the EEOC and employers. Other outside factors
may enter into and have an important influence on the future litigation under
the Act. There is a definite belief in some quarters that the EEOC will receive
adjudicatory and enforcement powers in the near future similar to those of the
NLRB.6" Also, the EEOC is seriously undermanned in the face of a case load
in excess of 15,000 cases per year, and an eighteen-month backlog of cases has
already developed."7 There has also been a recent interest in equal employ-
ment opportunity litigation under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. What effect
resort to that Act will have on title VII remains to be seen. A Supreme Court
decision laying out rules for an accommodation of the two will probably be
necessary.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is a landmark case, and a lengthy stride in de-
fining what Professor William Gould has termed the "central meaning" of
title VII. His quotation of a statement made by Judge Tuttle in Culpepper v.
Reynolds Metals Co." probably best expresses the "central meaning" that
Griggs gives to title VII:
Racial discrimination in employment is one of the most deplorable forms of
discrimination known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual's
sharing in the "outer benefits" of being an American citizen, but rather the
ability to provide decently for one's family in a job or profession for which he
qualifies and chooses. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with
a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate
this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the Courts to make
sure that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a
combination of a strict construction of the statute and the battle with se-
mantics.7
Robert N. Price
in New York promised a broad legal attack on many employers. The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and
Education Fund said, 'we are now ready to proceed with scores of cases in-
volving many thousands of workers who have been denied jobs or promo-
tions because of non-job-related tests which have come into widespread use
since passage' of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Wall Street Journal, Mar. 9, 1971, at 4, col. 1 (S.W. ed.).
"See notes 52-53 supra, and accompanying text.
0 See notes 25-28 supra, and accompanying text.
66Bills increasing the power of the EEOC have been introduced. See, e.g., H.R. 1746,
9247, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also Comment, Implementing Governmental Policy
Against Racial Discrimination in Employment: Fair Employment Practice Laws, Title VII,
National Labor Relations Act, and the Philadelphia Plan, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 157 (1970).
67 1970 COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 53 (1970).
"Id. at 75. See also Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1971).
69421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
70 Gould, The Central Meaning of Affirmative Action and Title VII, 33 TEx. B.J. 871,
872-73 (1970).
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